SHAREHOLDER CLASS ACTIONS IN AUSTRALIA: UNCERTAINTY FOR THE FUTURE OF MARKET-BASED CAUSATION

By John Freund |

The following article was contributed by Nikki Stever and Madison Smith of Australia-based commercial law firm, Piper Alderman.

In the third decision delivered in a shareholder class action in Australia,[1] Iluka Resources Limited (ASX: ILU), (Iluka) succeeded in its defence of a lawsuit[2] which failed to prove that the shareholders’ direct reliance on Iluka’s conduct caused their losses. However, the decision in favour of Iluka notably lacked any significant consideration of the second causation argument typically pleaded in shareholder class actions – market-based causation.

Background of the matter

Iluka is a large mining company and global supplier of mineral sand products. On 9 July 2012, Iluka revised its sales guidance for its products, resulting in a 25% drop in share price. The shareholders alleged that Iluka’s sales guidance leading up to its announcement:

  1. was misleading or deceptive; and
  2. breached their continuous disclosure obligations.

The lead applicant purported that reliance on the sales guidance impacted their decision to purchase shares in the company (direct reliance).  It is not clear to the authors if the lead applicant or shareholders pleaded that the market as a whole was impacted by the sales guidance (market-based causation).

The Federal Court of Australia (FCA) rejected both claims on the basis that the representations alleged were not actually made, and were merely statements/guidance about Iluka’s expectations and were not guarantees or predictions/forecasts of future performance.

The FCA also found that the lead applicant relied on various external stock reports rather than statements made by Iluka, causing the direct reliance case to fail.

Direct reliance and market-based causation

Direct reliance in a shareholder class action requires the claimant to prove they actually relied on the contravening conduct (i.e. statements) when deciding to acquire shares in the defendant company, and that the subsequent decrease in share price was directly related to the contravening conduct, resulting in loss to the shareholder.

Market-based causation is based on establishing that the price that the defendant’s shares traded on the market was inflated by the contravening conduct, such that the claimant prima facie suffered loss by paying an increased price for the shares.

The Court has accepted this proposition,[3] however, also suggested that it may still be necessary for individual shareholders to give evidence that, but for the contravention by an entity, they would not have purchased the shares (or not at the price paid) in order to establish loss.[4]

Causation and loss in Iluka

Because the Court found that no representations were made (and therefore they were not capable of being relied upon, either directly or by the market), the judgment was relatively quiet in relation to causation. While there is reference to the failed direct reliance case, in so far as it was held that the lead applicant did not rely on the sales guidance issued by Iluka when deciding to purchase the shares, unusually the judgment is completely silent on market-based causation. In previous cases where market-based causation has been alleged by the plaintiff, the but for test has been discussed by the FCA in the context of considering misleading or deceptive conduct claims.  For example, the alleged contraventions in Myer and Re HIH were assessed by considering whether the alleged loss would not have occurred but for the contraventions.[5]

The High Court in Australia has offered an alternative approach in cases of proving factual causation of misleading and deceptive conduct generally – the ‘a factor’ test.[6] The a factor test is satisfied if the misleading or deceptive conduct was a factor in the occurrence of the plaintiff’s loss, or in other words materially contributed to the plaintiff’s loss.

In Iluka, this test for market-based causation would be satisfied if the alleged contraventions materially contributed to the shareholders’ loss, rather than the more stringent test of whether the contraventions were necessary for the loss.

The a factor test, if adopted, arguably offers a more appropriate test for market-based causation in cases of misleading or deceptive conduct. Firstly, it is more reliable and intuitive.[7] For example, the but for test requires counterfactual speculation as to how a market would have responded but for a particular event. This can be a difficult exercise for a plaintiff to speculate and quantify the loss. The a factor test shifts the requirements from necessity to contribution and is not as easily defeated by a claim that it was not the only factor relevant to the plaintiff’s loss.

Secondly, the test also avoids duplicative causation, as market-based causation often involves multiple factors that could have affected share prices.[8] The court does not need to assess each separate factor and consider its relative relevance to the causal loss overall, as is required when assessing the causal conduct following the but for test.

Finally, the a factor test promotes the deterrence of all misleading or deceptive conduct by providing a broad opportunity for the conduct to be considered misleading or deceptive, regardless of whether it was necessary for the loss.[9]

Conclusion

By failing to address market-based causation, the Iluka decision has created uncertainty around what causal test the court would be willing to accept for shareholders to succeed with a market-based causation claim. It is only a matter of time before there is a substantial decision on this point, however, until this occurs, the law on market-based causation remains unsettled.

About the Authors

Nikki Stever, Special Counsel  — Nikki specialises in complex litigation and disputes, with an emphasis on class actions and disputes involving corporations, competition and consumer legislation and disputes concerning breaches of trust and fiduciary duties. Nikki frequently works with litigation funders and is experienced in the structuring and conduct of funded litigation, across all Australian jurisdictions.

Madison Smith, Lawyer  — Madison is a litigation and dispute resolution lawyer at Piper Alderman with a primary focus on corporate and commercial disputes. Madison is involved in a number of large, complex matters in jurisdictions across Australia.

For queries or comments in relation to this article please contact Kat Gieras, Litigation Group Project Coordinator | T: +61 7 3220 7765 | E:  kgieras@piperalderman.com.au

[1] Following Crowley v Worley Limited [2020] FCA 1522 and TPT Patrol Pty Ltd as trustee for Amies Superannuation Fund v Myer Holdings Ltd [2019] FCA 1747.

[2] Bonham v Iluka Resources Ltd [2022] FCA 71.

[3] In the matter of HIH Insurance Limited (In Liquidation) [2016] NSWSC 482; TPT Patrol Pty Ltd as trustee for Amies Superannuation Fund v Myer Holdings Ltd [2019] FCA 1747.

[4] TPT Patrol Pty Ltd as trustee for Amies Superannuation Fund v Myer Holdings Ltd [2019] FCA 1747, [1671].

[5] In the matter of HIH Insurance Limited (In Liquidation) [2016] NSWSC 482; TPT Patrol Pty Ltd as trustee for Amies Superannuation Fund v Myer Holdings Ltd [2019] FCA 1747.

[6] Henville v Walker [2001] HCA 52, [61] and [106].

[7] Henry Cooney, Factual causation in cases of market-based causation (2021) 27 Torts Law Journal 51.

[8] Ibid.

[9] Ibid.

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Rowles-Davies: Retrospective Provision in Litigation Funding Bill is ‘Fundamentally Flawed’

By John Freund |

In an article shared on LinkedIn, Nick Rowles-Davies, founder and CEO of Lexolent, makes the case against the retrospective aspect of the UK government’s Litigation Funding Agreements (Enforceability) Bill. Whilst acknowledging that many within the industry disagree with his position, Rowles-Davies argues that ‘the Bill should be prospective only and that the retrospective element is fundamentally flawed.’

Rowles-Davies summarizes his extensive article into the following key points:

  1. ‘The starting point for any consideration of the Bill must be firstly to correct the various inaccurate Supporting Documents (to the Bill) such that the law as it stands, and has always stood, is properly reflected. 
  2. The Government has put forward no credible justification to support the retrospective provision in the Bill.
  3. When considered under the true set of facts, this legislation appears to be incompatible with the ECHR. 
  4. The justification for the Bill’s prospective elements and its (arguably unprecedented) retrospective aspect must be considered separately. The Supporting Documents grossly misrepresent the position. Save for pure value transfers from previously funded parties to existing funders, what the Bill properly seeks to achieve can be accomplished through prospective only legislation. 
  5. If retrospectivity survives, it is likely that the matter will come before the courts quickly thereafter in relation to the ECHR.’

Rowles-Davies argues in the article that ‘the Supporting Documents to the LFA Bill provide absolutely no evidence of legal precedent to support the retrospective aspect of the Bill.” He goes on to say that not only is this bill ‘unprecedented’, but it also fails to provide ‘credible “public interest” justification for the retrospective aspect.’ 

In the conclusion of the article, Rowles-Davies calls on both chambers of Parliament to ‘take proper time to explore the foundation upon which the Bill rests and then test its contents after it has been repaired.’ Furthermore, he argues that ‘the positioning of the Bill is disrespectful to a busy Parliament tasked with addressing far more pressing global, social, and public interest matters.’

Bills Targeting Litigation Finance Disclosure and Foreign Funders Make Progress in Louisiana

By John Freund |

Reporting by Bloomberg Law covers the campaign to introduce new rules governing litigation funding in the state of Louisiana, with proponents of the legislation sensing an opportunity to make progress since the state elected a new governor, Jeff Landry. The two bills making their way through the Legislature are: HB336, which would create a Litigation Financing Disclosure Act, and SB355, which would enact ‘transparency and limitations on foreign third-party litigation funding’. 

In an interview with Bloomberg, Representative Emily Chenevert ,who brought HB336, explained that the turnover in elected representatives provided a fresh opportunity, saying: “The appetite was there already within the legislature and so now it’s like, let’s attempt this and let’s see with a new House and some new senators what could happen.” Dai Wai Chin Feman, managing director at funder Parabellum Capital, spoke out in opposition to Chenevert’s bill but said that SB355 was “acceptable to our industry.”

HB336 would require any party in a civil action to disclose the existence of a litigation financing agreement, whilst redacting the financial details of the agreement, and would make all financing arrangements ‘permissible subjects of discovery’. The bill also prohibits funders from controlling or making any decisions in the proceedings, stating that ‘The right to make these decisions remains solely with the plaintiff and the plaintiff's attorney in the civil proceeding.’

SB355 requires any foreign litigation funder involved in a civil action in Louisiana to disclose its details to the state’s attorney general (AG), and to provide the AG with a copy of the funding agreement. Similarly to HB336, this bill would prohibit the foreign funder from controlling the legal action in any way and also prohibits the funder from being ‘assigned rights in a civil action for which the litigation funder has provided funding’.

HB336 has been approved by the state House and was referred to the Senate Judiciary Committee, whilst SB355 has cleared the majority of procedural hurdles and now awaits a vote by the House.

Stonward’s Demarco: Funding Market Trending Towards Consolidation and Specialization

By John Freund |

In an interview with Leaders League, Guido Demarco, head of legal assets at Stonward, discusses the current state of the litigation funding market. The interview explores recent trends affecting funders, the nuances of the Spanish funding market, and Stonward’s own approach to legal strategy and market specialization.

Beginning with an overview of the global litigation funding industry, Demarco highlights the move towards consolidation, with funders specializing in specific legal sub-sectors or markets. Demarco says that this approach allows funders “to leverage expertise in particular legal domains or jurisdictions, enhancing their ability to assess and manage risks effectively.” He goes on to explain that the cost burden of case origination and due diligence, along with the need for specialized experts for each legal area, means that consolidation allows funders to maximise capital efficiency and scale their operations.

Focusing on the Spanish market, Demarco describes the country as a “promising hub” for litigation finance, pointing to the jurisdiction’s “sophisticated legal market” and its position as “a double gateway to the broader Latin American continent and the EU market.” Referencing his earlier explanation of the trend towards consolidation, Demarco argues that this has benefitted Spain as the market continues to attract specialist funders who can build an on-the-ground footprint in the market. As for Stonward’s exclusive focus on the Spanish funding market, Demarco says that this strategy has allowed the business “to develop an in-depth understanding of local legal intricacies, enabling the team to navigate the unique challenges and opportunities presented by Spanish procedural law.”