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What Lloyd v. Google Means for UK Class Actions and Litigation Funders

By John Freund |

The Lloyd v. Google claim has given rise to some thought-provoking questions:

  • Has Google breached its duties as a data controller? If so, have class members of the ensuing collective action suffered quantifiable damages?
  • How exactly should “same interest” be determined in a case regarding the misuse of data?
  • Do individual members of a class have to demonstrate material harm in order to receive recompense?

In the following article, we will explore the answers to these and other questions that have arisen from Case UKSC 2019/0213, otherwise known as Lloyd v. Google.

What Exactly Happened?

Richard Lloyd, sought to file a claim against tech giant Google, asking for compensation pursuant to section 13 of the Data Protection Act of 1998. The accusation involves the use of cookies in a ‘Safari workaround’ that ultimately collected, then disseminated, user data into metrics that were then used to employ targeted advertising to users.

This alleged misuse ostensibly impacted over four million iPhone users in England and Wales, whose data was unlawfully accessed by Google. Google’s use of the data was found to be a breach of DPA1998.

Lloyd sued not only on his own behalf, but on behalf of others whose data was treated similarly. Google fought the suit, saying that class members could not demonstrate material harm from the misuse of data. In a case like this one, ‘material harm’ could include monetary losses or mental anguish stemming from the illegal harvesting or dissemination of data.

Lloyd’s claim was backed by Therium, a prominent litigation funder specializing in tech-related cases. Lloyd’s legal team argued that the ‘same interest’ mandate had been satisfied, and that awarding all class members the same sum in damages is reasonable—without a need to delve into the personal circumstances of every individual claimant.

The Decision 

Initially, the High Court ruled in favor of Google. When the court of appeal reversed the ruling, Google appealed again to the Supreme Court. In the majority decision, Lord Leggatt determined the following:

  • The determination of “damage” must include verifiable, material damages such as financial or mental anguish. Mere illegality of an action is not enough to necessitate financial recompence.
  • Damages must be demonstrated.

Why are the Facts Here so Important?

Obviously, there is reason to be concerned when a tech company in control of an extremely large amount of user data is accused of illegally managing that data. In this instance, Google allegedly sold or used user data for commercial/money-making purposes. This was done without the knowledge or consent of its users. One could argue that any user who utilized Google on an Apple iPhone has reason to be dismayed (indeed, a similar case settled before going to trial).

The case also illustrates the importance of opt-in versus opt-out models, as well as what can happen when the majority of class members choose to abstain from involvement in the case proceedings. Under Lord Leggatt’s ruling, an opt-out model is not feasible in any instance requiring that class members be able to show tangible losses. Ultimately, tech giants like Google are required to abide by their own user agreements. However, users must prove suffering beyond the violation of their right to privacy.

Ironically, one area of doubt in such a case arises over how shares of a payout (to litigation funders, for example) can properly be calculated without consent of all class members. Just as many class members in an opt-out proceeding may not know the details of the case, they also may be totally unaware of the claim, or of how any proceeds are to be divided.

What Do These Developments Mean for Litigation Funders and Potential Claimants?

The idea that a claimant must demonstrate damages in order to receive compensation is neither new nor controversial. But it does put a damper on collective actions with high class member counts. Especially when looking at cases against huge companies like Visa/Mastercard, Apple, or Google. Many would argue that it’s simply not feasible to collect information about losses from millions of potential claimants.

So, while this line of thinking is reasonable under English law, it may well discourage litigation funders from taking on cases requiring that all class members demonstrate individual losses. This, in turn, will make the pursuit of justice more difficult for potential members of a wronged class.

For litigation funders, the difference between one potential claimant in a case and the millions who could have been class members in Lloyd v Google is significant. While we know that funders ultimately back cases to increase access to justice and give claimants a day in court—we also know that this relies on investors, whose motivation to invest is profit-driven. In short, litigation finance only works in the long term, when it’s financially advantageous to investors.

The question of privacy rights is a tricky one. Having one’s privacy violated is, as the phrase suggests, a violation. But as it typically has no financial component beyond the negative feelings associated, it is unlikely to serve as a demonstrable loss in a case involving user data (unless, of course, a further demonstrable loss can be proven).

At the same time, it is clear that Google misused user data, intentionally and without consent—with an eye toward financial gain. Surely it makes sense that Google should share some of that income with the users whose data was breached?

Not according to the UK Supreme Court, apparently.

A Missed Opportunity 

Had Lloyd vs. Google succeeded in the way Lloyd intended, it could have changed the way class actions in data cases were handled by the courts. Essentially, opt-out class actions could have flourished as individual class members wouldn’t be required to demonstrate financial damages.

This has particular relevance to data cases, because when data companies use information in ways that are not in keeping with their own TOS, users may not be damaged financially. But this lack of demonstrable damages doesn’t necessarily mean a) data companies don’t have a moral obligation to offer users recompense, or b) that users aren’t deserving of a payout when they are wronged.

Had Lloyd’s legal team instead used a bifurcated approach to the proceedings, a smaller opt-in class could perhaps have enabled a stronger case through the gathering of evidence—specifically evidence of damages. Similarly, a Group Litigation Order (GLO), which, despite what some see as high administrative costs, would have better determined eligibility for class members. This, in turn, would have allowed for a better test of the case’s merits.

In Conclusion

Lloyd vs. Google demonstrates the importance of several aspects of class action litigation, including how opt-in versus opt-out impacts the collection, as well as ability to bring evidence of damages. This promises to be a factor in future tech cases—not just in the UK, but globally.

Will the failure to secure damages for those whose data was misused embolden Big Tech? Will it serve as a warning? Could it discourage litigation funders from backing such cases?

We’ll have to wait and see. For now, it’s clear that Lloyd vs. Google has left its mark on the UK legal and litigation funding worlds—and on Big Tech as a whole.

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Commercial Regulatory Issues

Legislation to ensure the enforceability of LFAs is progressing smoothly through Parliament

By John Freund |

The following is a contributed piece by Tom Webster, Chief Commercial Officer at Sentry Funding.

So far, the Litigation Funding Agreements (Enforceability) Bill has been passing through Parliament without a hitch.

The government is bringing the legislation in response to the Supreme Court’s decision last summer in PACCAR Inc & Ors v Competition Appeal Tribunal & Ors [2023] UKSC 28, which called into question the enforceability of LFAs.

The Bill was briefly introduced into the House of Lords on 19 March, and was debated at second reading on 15 April. During the debate, while some peers discussed the need for regulation of the litigation funding industry and for careful consideration of whether the retrospective nature of the legislation was justified, no peers opposed the Bill – and many welcomed it.

More recently, during scrutiny at grand committee on 29 April, the relatively small number of peers who attended the session broadly supported the Bill, and several spoke in favour of the need for its provisions to be retrospective.

In terms of the Bill’s drafting, the government proposed some small changes at committee stage, which were waved through by peers. The most significant was to address a potential problem with the original drafting where the LFA relates to the payment of costs rather than funding the provision of advocacy or litigation services.

The problem was that, in the original wording, it could be argued that the Bill only applied to the funding of costs that relate to court proceedings, but not those relating to arbitration, or settlements. This has now been resolved by new wording to make clear that an LFA may relate to the payment of costs following court, tribunal or arbitration proceedings, or as part of a settlement. An LFA may also relate to the provision of advocacy or litigation services.

Meanwhile another government amendment was aimed at avoiding problems for litigants-in-person, by ensuring that the definition of LFAs in the Bill includes agreements to fund the expenses of LiPs, for example where they need to pay for an expert’s report.

During grand committee, peers also expressed their approval of the broad terms of reference that have now been published by the Civil Justice Council for its review of litigation funding, which will include an examination of whether the sector should be regulated; and if so, how. Peers commended the speedy timescale that the CJC has set itself, aiming to produce an interim report by the summer, and a full report by summer 2025.

As the Litigation Funding Agreements (Enforceability) Bill continues its journey through Parliament and the CJC begins work on its review, there are clearly significant changes on the way for the litigation funding sector in the UK.

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Commercial Regulatory Issues

Rowles-Davies: Retrospective Provision in Litigation Funding Bill is ‘Fundamentally Flawed’

By John Freund |

In an article shared on LinkedIn, Nick Rowles-Davies, founder and CEO of Lexolent, makes the case against the retrospective aspect of the UK government’s Litigation Funding Agreements (Enforceability) Bill. Whilst acknowledging that many within the industry disagree with his position, Rowles-Davies argues that ‘the Bill should be prospective only and that the retrospective element is fundamentally flawed.’

Rowles-Davies summarizes his extensive article into the following key points:

  1. ‘The starting point for any consideration of the Bill must be firstly to correct the various inaccurate Supporting Documents (to the Bill) such that the law as it stands, and has always stood, is properly reflected. 
  2. The Government has put forward no credible justification to support the retrospective provision in the Bill.
  3. When considered under the true set of facts, this legislation appears to be incompatible with the ECHR. 
  4. The justification for the Bill’s prospective elements and its (arguably unprecedented) retrospective aspect must be considered separately. The Supporting Documents grossly misrepresent the position. Save for pure value transfers from previously funded parties to existing funders, what the Bill properly seeks to achieve can be accomplished through prospective only legislation. 
  5. If retrospectivity survives, it is likely that the matter will come before the courts quickly thereafter in relation to the ECHR.’

Rowles-Davies argues in the article that ‘the Supporting Documents to the LFA Bill provide absolutely no evidence of legal precedent to support the retrospective aspect of the Bill.” He goes on to say that not only is this bill ‘unprecedented’, but it also fails to provide ‘credible “public interest” justification for the retrospective aspect.’ 

In the conclusion of the article, Rowles-Davies calls on both chambers of Parliament to ‘take proper time to explore the foundation upon which the Bill rests and then test its contents after it has been repaired.’ Furthermore, he argues that ‘the positioning of the Bill is disrespectful to a busy Parliament tasked with addressing far more pressing global, social, and public interest matters.’

Commercial Regulatory Issues

Bills Targeting Litigation Finance Disclosure and Foreign Funders Make Progress in Louisiana

By John Freund |

Reporting by Bloomberg Law covers the campaign to introduce new rules governing litigation funding in the state of Louisiana, with proponents of the legislation sensing an opportunity to make progress since the state elected a new governor, Jeff Landry. The two bills making their way through the Legislature are: HB336, which would create a Litigation Financing Disclosure Act, and SB355, which would enact ‘transparency and limitations on foreign third-party litigation funding’. 

In an interview with Bloomberg, Representative Emily Chenevert ,who brought HB336, explained that the turnover in elected representatives provided a fresh opportunity, saying: “The appetite was there already within the legislature and so now it’s like, let’s attempt this and let’s see with a new House and some new senators what could happen.” Dai Wai Chin Feman, managing director at funder Parabellum Capital, spoke out in opposition to Chenevert’s bill but said that SB355 was “acceptable to our industry.”

HB336 would require any party in a civil action to disclose the existence of a litigation financing agreement, whilst redacting the financial details of the agreement, and would make all financing arrangements ‘permissible subjects of discovery’. The bill also prohibits funders from controlling or making any decisions in the proceedings, stating that ‘The right to make these decisions remains solely with the plaintiff and the plaintiff's attorney in the civil proceeding.’

SB355 requires any foreign litigation funder involved in a civil action in Louisiana to disclose its details to the state’s attorney general (AG), and to provide the AG with a copy of the funding agreement. Similarly to HB336, this bill would prohibit the foreign funder from controlling the legal action in any way and also prohibits the funder from being ‘assigned rights in a civil action for which the litigation funder has provided funding’.

HB336 has been approved by the state House and was referred to the Senate Judiciary Committee, whilst SB355 has cleared the majority of procedural hurdles and now awaits a vote by the House.