Litigation Funding and Work Product / Common Interest Doctrines

In a contributed article to Law360, Bob Koneck, Chris Le Neve Foster and Richard Butters from specialist insurance broker Atlantic Global Risk, discuss an innovative model for litigation finance. The authors explain that this new model, which they describe as ‘insurance-backed litigation funding’, is differentiated from traditional approaches to litigation funding through ‘the pricing and the parties’. 

Expounding upon this idea, the authors detail how the structure of insurance-backed funding arrangements differ, with the law firm or client first securing an insurance policy to cover a minimum amount of recovery before non-recourse capital is secured to finance the litigation itself. This funding arrangement means that the capital will be repaid by two separate sources: the damages from the case and the ‘the proceeds of the insurance policy that will pay out if the financed litigation yields a monetary recovery insufficient to repay the funder.’

The authors further explain that using this model in cases where the claimant is unsuccessful, ‘the loss triggers a payout under the insurance policy that repays the funders their deployed capital and, depending on the structure of the financing, some or all of the funders' accrued but unpaid interest.’

As for the relative pros and cons of adopting an insurance-backed approach, the authors argue that this model is ‘usually cheaper’, due to the fact that it allows ‘insurance-backed funders to price their capital using an interest rate, without any right to the remaining upside in the litigation.’ On the other hand, insurance-backed funding creates an ‘enhanced execution risk’, as the increase in the number of parties involved in closing any funding arrangement can ‘slow or complicated the process.’

The full article, which explains the different aspects of insurance-backed litigation funding and the process for acquiring it, can be read here.

The business of mass tort funding continues to be grow in the world of litigation finance, with the potential for large settlements being secured if the claims can attract a sufficiently high volume of claimants.

An opinion piece by Sujeet Indap in the Financial Times looks at the recent announcement of a settlement in the Johnson & Johnson talcum powder mass tort case, and the ways in which it has put the contentious role of litigation funders in the spotlight once more. Indap highlights that J&J used its press release announcing the settlement to take aim at “the unregulated and surreptitious financing of product litigation”, which it argued had created financial incentives for these large-scale mass tort cases.

Furthermore, Indap notes that J&J has since informed the federal court that it would be seeking details around the funders’ of the talc litigation, and would be serving Fortress Investment Group with a subpoena. J&J have argued that the involvement of litigation funders like Fortress have made the bargaining and settlement process more difficult, claiming that the priorities of the plaintiffs’ lawyers have been complicated by the need to ensure sufficient financial returns on the funders’ investments.

Speaking with Indap for the article, Samir Parikh, law professor at Wake Forest University, suggested that the most important factor in the success or failure of mass torts is the ability of lawyers and other third-parties to find and register huge numbers of claimants for these cases. Parikh argues that, rather than being focused on the merits of the claims being brought, “the name of the game is really marketing, or ‘building inventory’.”