Term Sheet Exclusivity & MAC Clauses: Good or Bad Things for the Funding Industry?

At last week’s 2nd Annual Financing, Structuring and Investing in Litigation Finance conference, hosted by IMN in New York City, the third panel of the day discussed the topic of term sheet exclusivity. Namely, should funders mandate an exclusivity period whereby the claimant cannot approach or discuss potential funding, while the initial funder performs due diligence on the case?

The panel was moderated by Andrew Langhoff of Red Bridges Advisors, and comprised of Caline Mouawad (King & Spalding), Douglas Gruener (Levenfeld Pearlstein), Ross Wallin (Curiam Capital), Boris Ziser (Schulte Roth & Zabel) and Joshua Metlzer (Woodsford Litigation Funding).

Langhoff began by explaining that he understands the obvious reason behind including an exclusivity period. That said, he sees two “insidious consequences” with its inclusion. The first is what he termed “the damaged goods problem.” Essentially, there is no certainty that the deal gets done during the exclusivity period, and any claimant who shoots down a funder’s advances during that time may have to come crawling back, at which point they might already be labelled ‘damaged goods.’

The second issue plays off the damaged goods concept. Since funders are well aware that claimants can’t exactly go crawling back to funders whom they shot down, the funder with the exclusivity can afford to play hardball. Some will drag out the exclusivity period and offer more onerous terms than what was agreed upon initially (citing material changes to the claim. which may or may not be legitimately ‘material’ — more on that below).

Joshua Meltzer of Woodsford was the first to respond, saying he agreed with Langhoff’s contention that there are problems inherent in an exclusivity period. He has personally seen scenarios where a funder has used its leverage during an exclusivity period to offer “radically different” term sheets than what was agreed upon.

Bors Ziser of Schulte Roth & Zabel responded by pointing out that “that cuts both ways.” Plaintiffs can always come back to the funder and claim that something wasn’t in the term sheet, and then walk away. The funder is the one who spent time, money and energy diligencing the case during the exclusivity period.

Ziser also mentioned how claimants can use their term sheet to extract better terms from other funders whom they engage with. That might violate the NDA agreement, but so what? When has an NDA ever been enforced..?  (It is perhaps ironic that Meltzer, the litigation funder, agreed with Langhoff that funders often exploit the exclusivity period, while Ziser, the attorney, pointed out how claimants can be the ones who exploit the situation).

It was here that Langhoff highlighted the break fee which many funders are enacting, in lieu of an exclusivity period. The break fee enables claimants to discuss terms with other funders, however once the term sheet is signed, claimant will owe the funder a certain amount if the deal isn’t done for any reason. A break fee ensures that funders are at least compensated for their time and effort diligencing the claim.

Yet there are issues of collectability around a break fee. How will funders enforce that? One idea that was mentioned was that funders may collect the break fee upfront, and simply return the amount along with the funding once the deal is done. Of course, claimants and law firms won’t exactly like hearing that they have to pay an upfront break fee, and that might subordinate a funder in the queue, assuming there are a handful of funders who are itching to do the deal.

The question was never resolved, and it’s likely that many funders are currently grappling with this very issue. At this point, the conversation bled into a discussion on whether funders can indeed pull funding based on a material change in the case. Boris Ziser pointed out that often times term sheets are intentionally ambiguous – stating that funders can pull funding if there is a ‘material adverse change’ in a case, also known as a MAC Clause. But what constitutes a material adverse change?

Ross Wallin of Curiam noted that enforcement of MAC Clauses is often a last resort on the part of funders, who prefer to bring all parties together and hash out any differences, especially given that there is repetitional risk at play here. “If you have a reputation of firing that bullet too aggressively, you re going to find yourself starved of opportunities,” Wallin explained.

In other words, funders with a reputation for pulling funding based on vague terminology might find themselves on the outs the next time a potential claim comes down the pike. The world of funding – while growing – is still quite small, and everyone seems to know each other well enough that  reputational risk is considered a major potential hazard.

So while issues like exclusivity periods and MAC clauses may seem like good ideas – and in fact be very practical, as well as standard operating procedure in financial transactions – the reality of reputational risk which funders face often precludes either their enforcement, or their very inclusion in the term sheets in the first place.

One thing for funders to keep an eye on is industry commoditization. Should the industry commoditize further (as some predict), that implies that claimants and law firms will hold more of the cards during a potential transaction. Funders who offer onerous terms like exclusivity and MAC clauses may be unknowingly hurting their chances, as they compete with a growing pool of competitors.