Operating Costs inherent in the Commercial Litigation Finance Asset Class (Part 1 of 2)

By John Freund |

The following article is part of an ongoing column titled ‘Investor Insights.’ 

Brought to you by Ed Truant, founder and content manager of Slingshot Capital, ‘Investor Insights’ will provide thoughtful and engaging perspectives on all aspects of investing in litigation finance. 

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

  • Article draws comparisons between commercial litigation finance and private equity (leverage buy-out) asset classes
  • Similarities and differences exist between private equity and litigation finance operating costs, but there are some significant jurisdictional differences to consider
  • Value creation is front-end loaded in litigation finance vs. back-end loaded in private equity
  • Litigation finance can be a difficult investment to scale while ensuring the benefits of portfolio theory

INVESTOR INSIGHTS

  • The ‘2 and 20’ model is an appropriate baseline to apply to litigation finance, but investors need to understand the potential for misalignment of interests
  • As with most asset classes, scale plays an important role in fund operating costs
  • Deployment risk and tail risk are not insignificant in this asset class
  • Investor should be aware of potential differences in the reconciliation of gross case returns to net fund returns
  • Up-front management fees may have implications for long-term manager solvency

My overarching objective for Slingshot is to educate potential investors about the litigation finance asset class and to improve industry transparency, as I believe increased transparency will ultimately lead to increased investor interest and increased access to capital for fund managers.  In this light, I was asked to write an article a few months back about management fees in the commercial litigation finance sector, and my immediate reaction was that it would be a controversial topic that may not even be in my own best interests—and so I parked the idea.  However, the seed was germinating and I began to think about an interesting discussion of the various operating costs, including management fees, inherent in and specific to the asset class, including geographic differences therein.

While I always attempt to provide a balanced point of view in my articles, I should first point out my conflict of interest as it relates to this article.  As a general partner of a commercial litigation finance fund-of-funds, and being in the design stages of my next fund offering, my compensation model is based on a combination of management fees and performance fees no different than litigation finance fund managers.  Accordingly, my personal bias is to ensure that I structure my own compensation to strike a balance between investor and manager so that each feels they are deriving value from the relationship.  If I overstep my bounds by charging excessive fees, I believe that a competitive market will recognize the issue and prevent me from raising sufficient capital to make my fund proposition viable.  I am also kept in check by a variety of other managers in the same and similar asset classes who are also out raising money which help to establish the “market” for compensation. I further believe a smart allocator, of which there are many, will know what fee levels are acceptable and appropriate based on the strategy being employed and the resources required to deploy capital into acceptable investments (they see hundreds, if not thousands, of proposals every year, and are focused on the compensation issue).  On the other hand, the litigation finance market is a nascent and evolving market with many different economic models, specific requirements and unique participants, and so a ‘market standard’ does not exist, therefore it is common to look at similar asset classes (leveraged buy-out, private credit, etc.) to triangulate an appropriate operating cost model.

At the end of the day, the most compelling philosophy of compensation is rooted in fairness.  If a manager charges excessive fees and their returns suffer as a result, that manager will likely not live to see another fund. However, if  a manager takes a fair approach that is more “LP favourable” in the short-term (as long as the compensation doesn’t impair its ability to invest appropriately), it can move its fees upward over time in lock-step with its performance as there will always be adequate demand to get into a strong-performing fund.  There are many examples in the private equity industry of managers who have been able to demand higher performance fees based on their prior performance.  So, if you have a long-term view of the asset class and your fund management business, there really is no upside in charging excessive fees relative to performance, but there is clear downside.

With my conflict disclosed, let’s move on to the issues at hand which are more encompassing than just fees.

Litigation Finance as a Private Equity Asset Class

For fund managers operating in the commercial litigation finance asset class, many view themselves as a form of private equity manager, and for the most part, the analogy is accurate.  Litigation finance managers are compensated for finding attractive opportunities (known as “origination”), undertaking due diligence on the opportunities (or “underwriting”, to use credit terminology) and then stewarding their investments to a successful resolution over a period of time while ensuring collection of proceeds.

Similarly, Private Equity (“PE”) investors (for purposes of this article I refer to “Private Equity” as being synonymous with “leveraged buy-outs”, although use of the term has been broadened over the years to encompass many private asset classes) spend most of their time on origination and diligence on the front-end of a transaction, and increasingly, on value creation and the exit plan during the hold period and back-end of the transaction, respectively.

In the early days of the PE industry, the value creation plan was more front-end loaded and centered around buying at X and selling at a multiple of X (known as “multiple arbitrage”), usually by taking advantage of market inefficiency, and accentuated through the use of financial leverage and organic growth in the business.  Over time, the multiple arbitrage strategy disappeared as competitors entered the market and squeezed out the ‘easy money’ by bidding up prices of private businesses.  Today, PE firms are more focused on operational excellence and business strategy than ever before (during the hold period of the transaction).  Having been a private equity investor for two decades I have seen a significant change in the PE value creation strategy.  While organic and acquisition growth still feature prominently in PE portfolio company growth strategies, the extent to which PE managers will go to uncover value opportunities is unprecedented.

This highlights a key difference between private equity and litigation finance.  In PE, the majority of the value creation happens after the acquisition starts, and ends when a realization event takes place.  In litigation finance, the fund manager, in most jurisdictions, is limited from “intermeddling” in the case once an investment has been made, so as to ensure the plaintiff remains in control of the outcome of the case and that the funder does not place undue influence on the outcome of the case.  Nonetheless, some litigation funders add value during their hold period by providing ongoing perspectives based on decades of experience, participating in mock trials, reviewing and commenting on proceedings to provide valuable insight, reviewing precedent transactions during the hold period to determine their impact on the value of their case, case management cost/budget reviews, etc.

Accordingly, it is easy to see that relative to private equity, the litigation finance manager’s ability to add value during the hold period is somewhat limited, legally and otherwise.  One could use this differential in “value add” to justify a difference in management fees, but a counter-argument would be that in contrast to private equity, litigation finance adds value at the front-end of the investment process by weeding out the less desirable prospects and focusing their time and attention on the ‘diamonds in the rough’.  Of course, private equity would make the same argument, the key difference being that in private equity there is much more transparency in pricing through market back-channeling (many of the same lenders, management consultants and industry experts know the status and proposed valuations of a given private equity deal) than what is found in the litigation finance industry. An argument can be made that inherent in litigation finance is a market inefficiency that is predicated on confidentiality, although I don’t believe that has been tested yet.

The other issue that differentiates litigation finance from PE is the scale of investing.  PE scales quite nicely in that you can have a team of 10 professionals investing in a $500 million niche fund and the same-sized firm investing $2B in larger transactions, while your operating cost base does not change much, which is what allows PE operations to achieve “economies of scale”.  In litigation finance, the number of very large investments is limited, and those investments typically have a different set of return characteristics (duration, return volatility, multiples of invested capital, IRR, etc.), so even if you could fund a large number of large cases, you may not want to construct such a portfolio, as large case financings will likely have a more volatile set of outcomes, so the fund would have to be large enough to allow diversification in the large end of the financing market during the fund’s investment period.  Accordingly, litigation finance firms typically have to invest in a larger number of transactions in order to scale their business, and doing so requires technology, people or both.  At this stage of the evolution of the litigation finance market, scale has been achieved mainly by adding people.  Accordingly, as the PE industry has been able to achieve economies of scale through growth, it is reasonable for investors to benefit from those economies of scale by expecting to be charged less in management fees per dollar invested.  The same may not hold true for litigation finance due to its scaling challenges, although there are niches within litigation finance that can achieve scale (i.e. portfolio financings & mass tort cases, as two examples) for which the investor should benefit.

The Deployment Problem

A third significant issue that litigation finance and investors therein have to contend with is deployment risk.  In private equity, managers typically deploy most of their capital in the investment on ‘day one’ when they make the investment.  They may increase or decrease their investment over time depending on the strategy and the needs of the business and the shareholders, but they generally deploy a large percentage of their investment the day they close on their portfolio acquisition.  Further, it is not uncommon for a PE fund manager to deploy between 85% and 100% of their overall fund commitments through the course of the fund.

Litigation Finance on the other hand rarely deploys 100% of its case commitment at the beginning of the investment, as it would not be prudent or value maximizing to do so.  Accordingly, it is not uncommon for litigation finance managers to ‘drip’ their investment in over time (funding agreements typically provide the manager with the ability to cease funding in certain circumstances in order to react to the litigation process and ‘cut their losses’).  The problem with this approach is that investors are being charged management fees based on committed capital, while the underlying investment is being funded on a deployed capital basis, which has the effect of multiplying the effective management fee, as I will describe in the following example.  This, of course, is in addition to the common issue of committing to a draw down type fund that has an investment period of between 2-3 (for litigation finance) and 5 (for private equity) years, for which an investor is paying management fees on committed capital even though capital isn’t expected to be deployed immediately.  Litigation finance adds a strategy-specific layer of deployment risk.

For purposes of this simplistic example, let’s contrast the situation of a private equity firm that invests $10 million on the basis of a 2% management fee model with that of a litigation finance manager that also invests $10 million, but does so in equal increments over a 3-year period.

 

Private Equity (PE) Model (based on a $10 million investment)

 Year 1Year 2Year 3
Capital Deployed1$10,000,000$10,000,000$10,000,000
2% Management Fee$200,000$200,000$200,000
Expressed as % of deployed capital (B)2%2%2%

 

Litigation Finance Model (based on a $10 million investment evenly over 3 years)

 Year 1Year 2Year 3
Capital Deployed1$3,333,333$6,666,666$10,000,000
2% Management Fee$200,000$200,000$200,000
Expressed as %1 of deployed capital (A)6%3%2%

 

Differences in Fees in relation to Capital Deployed

Absolute Difference(A-B)4%1%0%
Difference as a multiple of fees in PE ((A-B)/2%)2X0.5X0X

1 Calculated assuming the capital is deployed at the beginning of the year.

The difference highlighted above can be taken to extremes when you have a relatively quick litigation finance resolution shortly after making a commitment.  In this situation, you have deployed a relatively small amount of capital that hasn’t been invested for long, but has produced a strong return – this typically results in large gross IRRs, but a relatively low multiple of capital (although the outcome very much depends on the terms of the funding agreement).  While this phenomenon produces very strong gross IRRs, when the investor factors in the total operating costs of the fund, the negative impact of those costs can significantly affect net IRRs.  Accordingly, investors should be aware that this asset class may have significant ‘gross to net’ IRR differentials (as well as multiples of invested capital), and one could conclude erroneously that strong gross IRRs will contribute directly to strong Net IRRs, but the ultimate net returns will vary with capital deployment, case duration. extent of operating costs and timing thereof.

I wouldn’t want this observation to discourage anyone from investing in litigation finance, but awareness of this phenomenon is important and very much dependent on the strategy of the manager, the sizes and types of cases in which they invest, and of course, is in part a consequence of the uncertain nature of litigation.  As an investor, I do think it is appropriate and fair where a fund manager obtains a quick resolution, that the commitment underlying the resolution be recycled to allow the Investor a chance to re-deploy the capital into another opportunity and achieve its original portfolio construction objectives  – recycling is beneficial to all involved. However, I would argue that it is not necessarily fair to charge the investor twice for the same capital, as that capital has already attracted and earned a management fee.

Stage of Lifecycle of Litigation Finance

Perhaps litigation finance is at the same stage of development as private equity experienced 20 years ago in terms of finding the “multiple arbitrage” opportunities, but a key difference is that the success rates in litigation finance are lower and the downside is typically a complete write-off of the investment, whereas private equity has many potential outcomes between zero and a multiple of their initial investment.  Of course, the home runs in litigation finance can be quite spectacular.  The quasi-binary nature of the asset class does present a dilemma in terms of compensation for managers and the costs inherent in running the strategy. The scale and deployment issues raised above are other issues that need to be addressed by fund managers and their compensation systems.

Notwithstanding the aforementioned, it takes highly competent and well-compensated people to execute on this particular strategy which sets a floor on management fee levels. A well-run and diversified litigation finance fund should win about 70% of their cases, and if they underwrite to a 3X multiple for pre-settlement single cases, then they should produce gross MOICs of about 2X (i.e. ~70% of 3X) and net about 1.75X (after performance fees and costs).  This would be the type of performance that is deserving of a ‘2 and 20’ model as long as those returns are delivered in a reasonable time period.  Conversely, if the majority of a manager’s portfolio is focused on portfolio finance investing, there may have to be a different compensation scheme to reflect the different risk/reward characteristics inherent in the diversification, scale and cross-collateralized nature of this segment of the market. One size does not fit all.

Let’s also not forget that litigation finance is delivering non-correlated returns, and one could easily assess a significant premium to non-correlation, especially in today’s market.

In Part 2 of this two-part series, I will explore the application of the ‘2 and 20’ model to litigation finance in comparison to private equity, the implication of the private partnership terms of some of the publicly-listed fund managers, and other operating costs specific to litigation finance.

Investor Insights

Any fund operating model needs to be designed taking into consideration all of the operating costs inherent in the manager’s operational model in the context of expected returns and timing thereof.  Investors care about being treated fairly, sharing risk and sharing the upside performance in order to foster long-term relationships that reflect positively on their organizations’ ability to perpetuate returns.  Professional investors rely on data to make decisions, and in the absence of data which might get them comfortable with a manager’s performance, they will default to mitigating risk. Tail risk in this asset class is not insignificant, which makes investing that much more difficult.  A performing manager that does a good job of sharing risk and reward with investors will have created a sustainable fund management business that will ultimately create equity value for its shareholders beyond the gains inherent in its performance fees.

 Edward Truant is the founder of Slingshot Capital Inc., and an investor in the litigation finance industry (consumer and commercial).  Ed is currently designing a new fund focused on institutional investors who are seeking to make allocations to the commercial litigation finance asset class.

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Key Highlights from the Inaugural LF Dealmakers European Edition

By John Freund |

Last week, the LFJ team attended the inaugural LF Dealmakers European Edition, held across two days at the Royal Lancaster in London. Building on the longstanding success of Dealmakers’ New York event, the first edition of the European conference brought together an impressive selection of leaders from across the industry.

Spread across two days, LF Dealmakers featured an agenda packed with insightful conversations between some of the most prominent thought leaders in the European litigation finance market. An array of panel discussions covered everything from the looming potential of regulation to the increasing corporate adoption of third-party funding, with these sessions bolstered by a keynote interview between two of the key figures in the Post Office Horizon litigation.

A long road to justice for the postmasters

In a conference that managed to fill every single panel discussion with speakers engaged in some of the largest and most influential funded disputes taking place in Europe, the standout session of the two days provided unparalleled insight into one of the most famous cases of recent years. The keynote interview on ‘The Future of Litigation Funding in the Wake of the Post Office Horizon Scandal’ saw James Hartley, Partner and National Head of Dispute Resolution Freeths, and Neil Purslow, Founder & CIO, Therium, offer up a behind-the-scenes tale of the sub-postmasters campaign for justice.

Going back to their first involvement with the case, James Hartley reminded attendees that whilst those looking at the case post-judgement “might think it was a slam dunk”, this was not the viewpoint of the lawyers and funders who first agreed to lead the fight against the Post Office. As Hartley described it, this was a situation where you had “a government owned entity who would fight to the end”, with a multitude of potential issues facing the claimants, including the existence of criminal convictions, the limited amounts of documented evidence, and the fact that the Post Office was the party that had ninety percent of the data, documents, and evidence.

Hartley also offered his own perspective on the legal strategy adopted by the Post Office and its lawyers, noting that at every stage of the litigation, “every single issue was fought hard.” He went on to explain that whilst he was “not critical” of the defendant’s strategy in principle, there remains the underlying issue that “the arguments they made were not consistent with the evidence we were seeing.” Hartley used this particular point to illuminate the issues around defendant strategies in the face of meritorious litigation that is being funded. He summarised the core issue by saying: “There is nothing wrong with fighting hard, but it’s got to be within the rules, and in a way that helps the court get to a just outcome.”

Offering praise for the support provided by Purslow and the team at Therium to finance the case, Hartley stated plainly that “without Therium’s funding it would not have gone anywhere, it would not have even got off the ground.” Both Purslow and Hartley also used the case to highlight problems around the lack of recoverability for funding costs and how that incentivises defendants such as the Post Office to prolong litigation and inflate legal costs. Hartley said that he would welcome a change to rules that would allow such recoverability, arguing that in this case “it would have neutralised the Post Office’s strategy to just keep driving up costs on the claimants side.”

What problem is regulation solving?

It was unsurprising to find that questions around the future of regulation for the litigation funding industry were a regular occurrence at LF Dealmakers, with the event taking place only a few days on from the House of Lords’ debate on the Litigation Funding Agreements (Enforceability) bill. From the opening panel to conversations held in networking breaks between sessions, speakers and attendees alike discussed the mounting pressure from government and corporate opponents of third-party funding.

The view from the majority of executives at the event seemed to revolve around one question, which was succinctly put by Ben Moss from Orchard Global: “What are the specific issues that require regulation, and what is the evidence to support those issues?”

This question became somewhat of a rallying cry throughout the conference, with suggestions of increased scrutiny and oversight being turned back on the industry’s critics who make claims of impropriety without citing evidence to back up these claims. Whilst several speakers referenced the recent LFJ poll that found a broad majority are open to the potential for new regulation, Ben Knowles from Clyde & Co described a lot of the discourse around the issue as “a fairly partisan debate.”

Among the few speakers in attendance who offered a contrasting view on regulation, Linklaters’ Harriet Ellis argued that “regulation done right would be good for the industry.” However, even Ellis acknowledged that any rules would have to be carefully crafted to provide a framework that would work across the wide variety of funded disputes, saying that a “one size fits all approach does raise issues.”

Regarding the government’s own approach to the issue through the draft legislation making its way through parliament, all of the executives in attendance praised lawmakers’ attempts to find a solution quickly. Alongside these government-led efforts, there was also a feeling among legal industry leaders that funders and law firms have to be part of the solution by promoting more education and understanding about how litigation finance works in practice. Richard Healey from Gately emphasised the need for firms to engage in “hearts and minds work” to change wider perceptions, whilst Harbour’s Maurice MacSweeney emphasised the need to “create the environment where law firms and funders can flourish.”

Innovation through collaboration

Outside of the narrow debate around legislation and regulation, much of the conference was focused on the speed at which litigation finance continues to evolve and create new solutions to meet complex demands from the legal industry. This was perhaps best represented in the way speakers from a variety of organisations discussed the need for a collaborative approach, with executives from funders, insurers, law firms, investors and brokers, all discussing how the industry can foster best working practices.

The interplay between the insurance and funding industry was one area that offered plenty of opportunity for insightful discussions around innovation. Andrew Mutter from CAC Speciality noted that even though “insurers are not known for being the fastest and moving the most nimbly,” within the world of litigation risk “the insurance markets are surprisingly innovative.” This idea of an agile and responsive insurance market was backed up by the variety of off the shelf and bespoke products that were discussed during the conference, from the staples of After-The-Event and Judgement Preservation Insurance to niche solutions like Arbitration Default Insurance.

Delving into the increasingly bespoke and tailored approach that insurers can take when working with funders and law firms, Jamie Molloy from Ignite Speciality Risk, described how there are now “very few limits on what can be done by litigation insurers to de-risk.” Whilst there is sometimes a perception that insurers are competing with funders and lawyers for client business, Tamar Katamade at Mosaic Insurance offered the view that it is “more like collaboration and synergy” where all these parties can work together “to help the claimant and improve their cost of capital and reduce duration risk.”

Class action fervour across Europe

Throughout both days of the LF Dealmakers conference, the volume and variety of class actions taking place across the European continent was another hot topic. However, in contrast to an event focused on the American litigation finance market, the common theme at last week’s forum was the wideranging differences between large group claims across individual European jurisdictions. In one of the most insightful panels, the audience were treated to an array of perspectives from thought leaders practicing across the UK, Spain, and the Netherlands.

The example of Spanish class actions provided an incredibly useful view into the nuances of European claims, as a country that is still in the process of implementing legislation to comply with the EU’s collective actions directive, but has already evolved routes for these types of actions over the last decade. Paul Hitchings of Hitchings & Co. described how the initiative to innovate has come “more from the private sector than the legislature”, with domestic law firms having become “experienced with running massive numbers of parallel claims” as an inefficient, yet workable solution. Hitchings contrasted Spain’s situation with its neighbouring jurisdiction of Portugal, which he argued has been comparatively forward thinking due to the country’s popular action law.

Speaking to the Dutch class actions environment, Quirijn Bongaerts from Birkway, argued that the “biggest game changer” in the country was the introduction of a real class actions regime in 2020. Bongaerts explained that the introduction of this system allowed for “one procedure that fits all types of claims”, which allows not only claims for damages, “but also works for more idealistic cases such as environmental cases and ESG cases.”

LFJ would like to extend our thanks to the entire Dealmakers team for hosting such an engaging and insightful event, which not only offered attendees a view into the latest developments in litigation finance, but also created a plethora of networking opportunities throughout both days. LFJ has no doubt that after the success of the inaugural LF Dealmakers European edition, a return to London in 2025 will cement the conference as a must-attend feature in the litigation funding events calendar.

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The Dangers of Retrospective Legislation in Litigation Funding

By John Freund |

The debate around whether the Litigation Funding Agreements (Enforceability) Bill should be retrospective is a complex one, with valid arguments on both sides. A recent op-ed makes the case that retrospectivity poses significant dangers and unfairness.

Writing in LegalFutures, Jeremy Marshall, Chief Investment Officer of Winward UK, argues that the core issue is whether it is unfair to allow litigation funders to rely on contractual agreements that were freely entered into by both parties, even if those agreements were based on a mistake of law.

Marshall claims that the common law right to recover money paid under a mistake only applies when the mistake led to one party receiving an unintended benefit. In the case of litigation funding, the only benefit that has accrued is the one that was explicitly drafted into the contract. Allowing retrospectivity would open the door to satellite litigation and unreal counterfactuals, according to Marshall.

Claimants who have already received funding and won their cases are now arguing for the "right" to renegotiate and keep all the proceeds for themselves. But what about the funders' arguments that cases may have gone on longer or become more expensive than intended? Fairness demands that both sides' positions be considered.

Marshall insists that the true drawback in retrospectivity is the inherent danger of prejudicing one party to the exclusion of the other, or conferring an unexpected benefit to one party at the expense of the other. Ironically, this is precisely what those challenging the bill are attempting to do. So while the debate is a complex one, one can make a compelling case that retrospectivity in litigation funding poses significant dangers and unfairness.

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The CJC’s Review of Litigation Funding Will Have Far-Reaching Effects

By John Freund |

The following is a contributed piece by Tom Webster, Chief Commercial Officer at Sentry Funding.

Reform is on its way for the UK’s litigation funding sector, with the Civil Justice Council firing the starting gun on its review of litigation funding on 23 April.

The advisory body set out the terms of reference for its review, commissioned by lord chancellor Alex Chalk, and revealed the members of its core working group.

The review is working to an ambitious timetable with the aim of publishing an interim report by this summer, and a full report by summer 2025. It will be based on the CJC’s function of making civil justice ‘more accessible, fair and efficient’.

The CJC said it will set out ‘clear recommendations’ for reform in some areas. This includes consideration of a number of issues that could prove very significant for funders and clients. These include:

  • Whether the sector should be regulated, and if so, how and by whom;
  • Whether funders’ returns should be subject to a cap; and if so, to what extent;
  • The relationship between third party funding and litigation costs;
  • The court’s role in controlling the conduct of funded litigation, including the protection of claimants and ‘the interaction between pre-action and post-commencement funding of disputes’;
  • Duties relating to the provision of funding, including potential conflicts of interest between funders, lawyers and clients;
  • Whether funding encourages ‘specific litigation behaviour’ such as collective action.

The review’s core working group will be co-chaired by CJC members Mr Justice Simon Picken, a Commercial Court judge, and barrister Dr John Sorabji. The four other members are:

  • High Court judge Mrs Justice Sara Cockerill, who was judge in charge of the commercial court 2020 – 2022, and who is currently involved in a project on third party funding for the European Law Institute;
  • Academic and former City lawyer Prof Chris Hodges, chair of independent body the Regulatory Horizons Council which was set up to ensure that UK regulation keeps pace with innovation;
  • Lucy Castledine, Director of Consumer Investments at the Financial Conduct Authority; and
  • Nick Bacon KC, a prominent barrister and funding expert who acts for both claimants and defendants

The CJC had said that it may also bring in a consumer representative, as well as a solicitor experienced in group litigation.

In a sign that the review seeks to be informed by a wide range of views, the CJC has also extended an invitation for experts to join a broader consultation group, which will directly inform the work of the review and provide a larger forum for expert discussion. Meanwhile the advisory body has said there will also be further chance ‘for all to engage formally with this review’ later this year.

Given the broad remit of the review and significant impact that its recommendations may have on the litigation funding industry, litigation funders, lawyers and clients would be well advised to make the most of these opportunities to contribute to the review.

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